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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Martha Lorraine Moore appeals from the judgment entered upon her 
conditional guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine. On appeal, she 
challenges the denial of her motion to suppress. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The state charged Moore with possession of methamphetamine. (R., 
pp.26-27.) Moore moved to suppress the evidence against her, contending it 
was the fruit of an unlawful search. (R., pp.39-40, 44-50.) Following an 
evidentiary hearing, the district court entered a written Decision And Order On 
Motion To Suppress (R., pp.62-69) in which it made the following, uncontested, 
findings of fact: 
On March 30, 2011, Probation and Parole Officers, Julie 
Guiberson (Guiberson) and Paula Aldous (Aldous) went to 11300 
North Rio Vista Road #8-4, to search for probationer Ryan 
Mclnelly.[1] Guiberson was assigned to supervise Mclnelly while he 
was on probation. The purpose of the visit was to find and arrest 
Mclnelly on a bench warrant because he failed a drug test. 
Guiberson began her search for Mclnelly at the Rio Vista address 
because it was the residence she had approved prior to Mel nelly 
being released from the Bannock County Jail. Guiberson testified 
that prior to Mclnelly being released from jail she had two 
conversations with [Moore], during which [Moore] was advised of 
the fact that if Mclnelly resided in her home it would be subject to 
search without a warrant. [Moore] agreed to this condition. 
On the day in question Guiberson and Aldous were 
accompanied by two United States Marshalls and one Bannock 
County Sheriff's Officer. All of the officers were in uniform. After 
knocking on the door, the officers were allowed to enter the home 
by a minor child. The officers performed a protective sweep of the 
1 Mr. Mcinally is Moore's adult son. (Tr., p.7, L.16 - p.8, L.17, p.23, Ls.2-6.) 
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home searching for Mclnelly. During the sweep [Moore] was in the 
bathroom. Guiberson knocked on the bathroom door and 
announced her presence and asked [Moore] to exit the bathroom. 
Guiberson testified that in her opinion the three minutes [Moore] 
took in exiting the bathroom was an abnormally long time. When 
[Moore] exited the bathroom she was carrying a black purse which 
she threw onto a bed in a back bedroom before addressing the 
officers. The officers questioned [Moore] about Mclnelly's 
whereabouts. [Moore] responded that Mclnelly was not there but 
was looking for a job. Guiberson testified that [Moore] did not say 
that Mclnelly did not live there. 
Guiberson asked [Moore] to call Mclnelly, which she did. He 
confirmed on the telephone that he was job searching but did not 
confirm when he would return to the residence. There is no 
testimony that Mclnelly claimed he did not live at [Moore's] 
residence. 
Guiberson asked [Moore] if she and the other officers could 
search the entire residence, specifically including the back 
bedroom and the purse [Moore] had placed on the bed there. She 
testified that [Moore] gave permission and stated that Mclnelly was 
sleeping in that room. Guiberson wanted to make sure the 
residence was free of illegal substances and was a safe place for 
Mclnelly to stay. The officers then began to search the residence. 
During a search of the back bedroom the black purse that [Moore] 
had with her while exiting the bathroom was searched, revealing 
methamphetamine. 
Aldous testified that [Moore] did give permission to search 
anywhere the officers wanted, including the purse. She also 
testified that [Moore] agreed that Mclnelly was living there and that 
it was the only place he had to live. 
[Moore's] version of the events both agrees and differs from 
the officers' accounts. She testified that she had agreed that 
Mclnelly could live at her home, that she knew and agreed it could 
be searched without a warrant, and that Mclnelly had been living 
with her beginning February 23, 2011. She further testified, 
however, that Mclnelly hadn't lived at her home since March 17, 
2011, that she was told by Guiberson that a search could be 
conducted without her consent, and that she consented only to a 
search of the residence to locate her son. She claims that no 
permission for a comprehensive search was ever asked for or 
given. She also asserted that on March 29, 2011, the day before 
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the search, she had a telephone conversation with Guiberson 
where she told the officer that her son no longer lived with her; 
(R., pp.62-64.) Ultimately, the court found Moore's version of the facts not 
credible and denied her suppression motion, concluding that Moore's "home was 
Mclnelly's approved residence, that this was still Mclnelly's residence [on the day 
in question], and that [Moore] gave consent to search her residence, including 
the purse in question." (R., pp.66-68.) 
Moore entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of 
methamphetamine, reserving the right on appeal to challenge the denial of her 
motion to suppress. (R., pp.95-104; Tr., pp.108-14.) The district court accepted 
Moore's plea, entered a withheld judgment2 and placed Moore on probation for 
four years. (R., pp.108-15; Tr., p.129, Ls.13-16.) More timefy appeals. (R., 
pp.116-18.) 
2 Although the written document memorializing the court's sentencing decision is 
erroneously captioned "Minute Entry & Judgment Of Conviction" (R., p.108 
(emphasis added)), it is apparent both from the body of the document and from 
the court's oral pronouncement at sentencing that judgment was withheld (see 
R., p.109 (ordering that judgment be withheld); Tr., p.129, Ls.13-14 ("So I'm 
going to grant you a withheld judgment .... ")). 
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ISSUE 
Moore states the issue on appeal as: 
Whether the district court erred by not suppressing the evidence 
found during an illegal search which was conducted without the 
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent consent of Ms. Moore. 
(Appellant's brief, p.5.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
Has Moore failed to show clear error in the district court's finding that she 
voluntarily consented to the search of her home and purse while officers were 
lawfully in the home to conduct a probation search? 
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ARGUMENT 
Moore Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of Her Suppression Motion 
A. Introduction 
Moore challenges the denial of her motion to suppress, arguing the 
warrantless search of her residence and purse was not justified either pursuant 
to the terms of Mr. Mclnelly's probation or pursuant to her consent. (Appellant's 
brief, pp.6-12.) Moore's challenge fails. A review of the record, in light of the 
applicable legal standards, shows there is substantial evidence that supports the 
district court's finding that Moore voluntarily consented to the search of her home 
and purse while officers were lawfully in the home to conduct a probation search. 
Moore has failed to show that the district court erred in denying her motion to 
suppress. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether a consent to a search was voluntary is a question of fact, the 
determination of which is reviewed on appeal for clear error. State v. Reynolds, 
466, 472, 197 P.3d 327, 333 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Stewart, 145 Idaho 641, 
648, 181 P.3d 1249, 1256 (Ct. App. 2008). "Findings will not be deemed clearly 
erroneous if they are supported by substantial evidence in the record." Stewart, 
145 Idaho at 648, 181 P.3d at 1256 (quoting State v. Jaborra, 143 Idaho 94, 98, 
137 P.3d 481,485 (Ct. App. 2006)). 
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C. Moore Has Failed To Show Clear Error In The District Court's Factual 
Finding That She Voluntarily Consented To The Search Of Both Her 
Residence And Her Purse While Officers Were Lawfully In The Home To 
Conduct A Probation Search 
A warrantless search conducted pursuant to valid consent does not 
violate the Fourth Amendment. Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 219 
(1973) (citations omitted); State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796, 69 P.3d 1052, 
1057 (2003); State v. Varie, 135 Idaho 848, 852, 26 P.3d 31, 35 (2001). 
Voluntary consent to enter or search premises from a person with authority to 
consent vitiates the need for a warrant. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 
170 (1974); State v. Robinson, 152 Idaho 961, 965-66, 277 P.3d 408, 412-13 
(2012); State v. Brauch, 133 Idaho 215, 219, 984 P.2d 703, 707 (1999). 
Consent is valid if it is free and voluntary. Bustamante, 412 U.S. at 225-26 
(citations omitted). The state bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of 
the evidence that consent to a warrantless search was voluntarily given. State v. 
Ballou, 145 Idaho 840, 846, 186 P.3d 696, 702 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Stewart, 
145 Idaho 641,647, 181 P.3d 1249, 1255 (Ct. App. 2008). 
The voluntariness of an individual's consent is a question of fact to be 
determined based upon the totality of the circumstances. Varie, 135 Idaho at 
852, 26 P.3d at 35 (citing Bustamante, 412 U.S. at 248-49). In order to be valid, 
consent cannot be the result of duress or coercion, either direct or implied. 
Bustamante, 412 U.S. at 248. The mere presence of officers asking for consent 
to search is not sufficient, as a matter of law, to constitute improper police duress 
or coercion. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976). Instead, the 
court must consider all of the surrounding circumstances and find consent 
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involuntary only if "coerced by threats or force, or granted only in submission to a 
claim of lawful authority .... " State v. Hoisington, 104 Idaho 153, 158, 657 P.2d 
17, 22 (1983) (emphasis original) (quoting Bustamante, 412 U.S. at 233). 
Applying the foregoing principles to the evidence before it, the district 
court found that Moore voluntarily consented to the search of her residence and, 
more specifically, to the purse that contained the methamphetamine. The court 
explained: 
At the suppression hearing, Guiberson testified that prior to 
Mclnelly's release she spoke with [Moore] over the phone to have 
his housing approved. As part of this conversation Guiberson told 
[Moore] that her house would be subject to search. [Moore's] 
home would not have been approved housing for Mclnelly if 
[Moore] had not consented to warrantless searches of her home. 
Guiberson also testified that after entering the home, but prior to 
beginning the search she again received the consent of [Moore] to 
search the home to make sure it was a safe place for Mclnelly to 
live. After receiving consent the officers began to search the home 
and eventually found the methamphetamine. 
[Moore] does not dispute that she consented to warrantless 
searches of her home prior to Guiberson approving it for Mclnelly. 
[Moore] does disputes [sic] that consent to search the home was 
given again, at the time of the search. Instead [Moore] claims that 
she consented to a search of the home for Mclnelly only. 
[Moore] also claims to have had a conversation with 
Guiberson, the day before the search, that Mclnelly no longer lived 
there. Even if this claim were true the simple fact remains that 
[Moore's] home was listed as Mclnelly's reported residence. 
Additionally, there were male clothes found in the home_[FNJ 
Furthermore, when Guiberson questioned [Moore] about Mclnelly's 
whereabouts she stated he was out looking for a job and not that 
she didn't know where he was as one would anticipate if he did not 
live in her home. Why would [Moore] know where he was and what 
he was doing at that precise time if he hadn't been living there for 
two weeks? No other explanation was offered by [Moore]. When 
examining the totality of the circumstances, the clear weight of the 
evidence leads to the reasonable conclusion that Mclnelly 
continued to live in [Moore's] home. This also calls into question 
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[Moore's] credibility regarding the dispute in the testimony about 
the consent to search the residence that day. As his probation 
officer investigating a parole [sic] violation involving illegal drug use, 
Guiberson had the authority and responsibility to search the home 
for evidence relating to possible probation violations and to 
determine if the residence continued to be safe housing. After 
weighing the evidence, the Court concludes that [Moore's] home 
was Mclnelly's approved residence, that this was still Mclnelly's 
residence, and that [Moore] gave consent to search her residence, 
including the purse in question. 
[FN] [Moore] claimed that the clothes were her 
husband's but there was testimony that male clothes 
were found in another bedroom as well. 
(R., pp.66-68.) 
On appeal, Moore does not challenge the district court's finding that 
officers were lawfully in her home to search for evidence relating to possible 
violations of Mr. Mclnelly's probation.3 Instead, she argues that whatever 
consent Mr. Mclnelly gave to search the residence pursuant to the terms of his 
probation did not extend either to Moore's purse or to the bedroom in which that 
purse was found. (Appellant's brief, pp.7-10.) The state readily acknowledges 
that Mr. Mclnelly's consent to search, given as a condition of his probation, 
extended only to those areas of Ms. Moore's residence over which he had actual 
or apparent authority. See, sL9.:., State v. Hansen, 151 Idaho 342, 345-46, 256 
3 It is well settled that parolees and probationers enjoy a reduced expectation of 
privacy against governmental intrusion. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 
(2006); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001). Thus, a probationer is 
subject to warrantless searches by a probation officer if that probation officer has 
reasonable suspicion the probationer has violated probation. Knights, 534 U.S. 
at 121-22. Even absent reasonable suspicion of a probation violation, a search 
of probationers or parolees is reasonable if conducted according to an express 
probation or parole provision allowing suspicionless searches. Samson, 547 
U.S. at 852. 
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P.3d 750, 753-54 (2011) (Fourth Amendment wavier agreed to by probationer as 
a term of probation extended to areas defendant's home over which probation 
had apparent authority); Robinson, 152 Idaho at 965-66, 277 P.3d at412-13 
(consent given by one co-habitant of residence "extends only so far as common 
areas and items in the common areas over which the inhabitants share 
authority"). Whether or not Mr. Mclnelly's authority to consent extended to 
Moore's bedroom and purse is ultimately irrelevant, however, because the 
evidence shows, and the district court found, that Officer Guiberson obtained the 
consent to search directly from Moore herself. (R., pp.66-68; Tr., p.25, Ls.9-22, 
p.44, Ls.9-13, p.51, L.23 - p.53, L.6, p.54, Ls.17-18, p.56, Ls.2-24.) 
There is no dispute that Moore had authority to consent to the search of 
her own bedroom and purse. In fact, Moore appears to argue on appeal that she 
was the only person with authority to give such consent. (See Appellant's brief, 
p.8 ("[A]bsent Ms. Moore's valid consent, the search of the purse was unlawful."), 
pp.8-10 (arguing bedroom searched belonged exclusively to Moore or, 
alternatively, to Moore and her husband).) Thus, the only issue on appeal is 
whether the district court correctly concluded Moore's consent was freely and 
voluntarily given. Contrary to Moore's assertions on appeal, the record supports 
the district court's factual finding. 
Officer Guiberson testified that, after she spoke with Mclnelly on the 
telephone, she spoke to Moore again and "asked her if she would consent to a 
search of her home." (Tr., p.22, Ls.5-7.) According to Officer Guiberson, Moore 
"was more than willing to do so. She said there's nothing here." (Tr., p.22, Ls.7-
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10.) When the officer asked specifically whether Moore "mind[ed] if [the officers] 
search[ed] the whole house," Moore "said no. She did not have any problems 
with that." (Tr., p.22, Ls.10-13; see also Tr., p.25, Ls.9-15.) Officer Guiberson 
also "specifically asked for permission to look through [Moore's] purse," in 
response to which Moore "said, yes, that's no problem." (Tr., p.25, Ls.15-22.) 
Officer Guiberson testified that at no point during the search did Moore ever ask 
the officers to stop searching any area of her home or purse. (Tr., p.44, Ls.9-
13.) 
Officer Aldous also testified that Moore gave officers permission to search 
her house and purse. (Tr., p.51, L.23 - p.53, L.6.) When asked on cross-
examination whether Moore placed any limitations on her consent to search, 
Officer Aldous testified, "No. [Moore] was very cooperative and said search what 
you want. She said there's nothing here. I haven't used in months." (Tr., p.56, 
Ls.2-7.) According to Officer Aldous, Moore was also "very cooperative" when 
Officer Guiberson found her purse. (Tr., p.56, Ls.17-24.) She identified it as her 
own, gave Officer Guiberson permission to search it and "seemed like she didn't 
have anything to worry about." (Tr., p.53, Ls.2-6, p.56, Ls.17-24.) 
Taken together, the testimony of Officers Guiberson and Aldous 
constitutes substantial evidence supporting the district court's finding that Moore 
freely consented to the search of her home and purse. Moore contends 
otherwise, arguing "[t]he totality of the circumstances indicate that Ms. Moore did 
not give voluntary consent; rather her consent was coerced." (Appellant's brief, 
p.10.) Moore's argument is unavailing because it relies on her own testimony, 
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which the district court specifically found was not credible, and otherwise fails to 
overcome the facts in the record supporting the court's voluntariness 
determination. 
For example, Moore contends the record shows she merely "acquiesced 
to a claim of lawful authority to search." (Appellant's brief, p.11.) To support this 
claim, Moore points to her own testimony "that Officer Guiberson claimed the 
right to search her home pursuant to the terms of Mr. Mclnelly's probation." 
(Appellant's brief, p.11 (citation omitted); see also id., p.11 ("Ms. Moore also 
testified that she consented to allow them to search for Mr. Mclnelly once Officer 
Guiberson told her that 'she had the right and that she could search anywhere 
she wanted in my home."' (citation omitted)); p.12 ("Officers represented to Ms. 
Moore that they could search her home pursuant to a probation waiver" (citation 
omitted).) Moore claims there "was no direct refutation of that evidence" 
(Appellant's brief, p.11 ), but the very portion of the transcript she cites for this 
proposition is Officer Guiberson's testimony that she did not recall ever making 
any such statements to Moore (see Tr., p.46, Ls.10-15). More importantly, the 
district court specifically found Moore's "credibility regarding the dispute in the 
testimony about the consent to search the residence that day" questionable. (R., 
pp.6-7.) For this reason, Moore's reliance on her own testimony, to the exclusion 
of other testimony in the record and the district court's findings, does not 
undermine the court's ultimate finding that Moore's consent was freely and 
voluntarily given. 
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Aside from relying on her own testimony, the only other evidence Moore 
points to in an attempt to establish her claim of "coercion" are the facts that 
Moore herself did not "sign any written waiver or consent for waiving her Fourth 
Amendment rights as a result of having a probationer living in her home" 
(Appellant's brief, p.11 (citation omitted)), and that "there were five armed 
officers at Ms. Moore's residence, three of whom were inside her house" (id., 
p.12 (citation omitted)). Even viewed collectively, these facts do not demonstrate 
"coercion." Moore has cited no authority for the proposition that officers were 
required to obtain a written waiver from Moore before searching her home and 
purse pursuant to her verbal consent. Nor does the mere presence of officers, 
none of whom drew their weapons or otherwise threatened Moore in any fashion, 
demonstrate Moore's will was overborne. See United States v. Watson, 423 
U.S. 411 (1976). While these facts may certainly be relevant to the 
determination of whether Moore's consent was voluntary, they are not sufficient 
to overcome the other facts in the record that, considered in their totality, support 
the district court's determination that Moore's consent was freely given. 
Substantial evidence supports the district court's finding, based on the 
totality of the circumstances, that Moore voluntarily consented to the search of 




The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the withheld 
judgment and the denial of Moore's motion to suppress. 
DATED this 3rd day of September 2013. 
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